<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>claude-plugins-official.git/.github/policy/schema.json, branch bump/cloud-sql-sqlserver</title>
<subtitle>Official Claude Code plugin directory
</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Tighten policy scan: hook scope, telemetry, disclosure; make blocking (#1771)</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T22:34:32+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobin South</name>
<email>tobin.south@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-07T22:34:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=76b35e91d1c99c090b1a08dade53bcc5e352c1b2'/>
<id>76b35e91d1c99c090b1a08dade53bcc5e352c1b2</id>
<content type='text'>
* Tighten policy scan: hook scope, telemetry, disclosure; make blocking

policy/prompt.md — adds Part 2 (hook scope and disclosure):
- Enumerate every registered hook and read its source.
- Flag has_broad_scope_hooks when UserPromptSubmit/PreToolUse/
  PostToolUse runs without a project-relevance gate, or any hook
  reads user data beyond the plugin's stated scope — regardless of
  whether it makes network calls.
- Flag has_undisclosed_telemetry when any hook or shipped code calls
  a non-MCP host without explicit disclosure + opt-out.
- Flag description_matches_behavior=false when the install
  description would not lead a reasonable user to expect the
  hooks/telemetry/data-access found.
- passes=false when any of the above trip. Violations must cite the
  specific hook/file and what the user wasn't told.

The bar is now "handles user data responsibly," not merely "isn't
malicious." A non-malicious plugin that observes more than its stated
purpose justifies will fail.

policy/schema.json — adds required hooks[], has_broad_scope_hooks,
has_undisclosed_telemetry, description_matches_behavior.

scan-plugins.yml:
- fail-on-findings: true (blocking — loosen later if FP rate too high)
- workflow_dispatch with scan_all input for full re-review of all
  external entries
- timeout-minutes: 360 (full scan of 117 entries at ~96s each ≈ 3h)
- trigger on .github/policy/** so prompt edits get scanned

* Bump vercel SHA to test the tightened scan against it</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* Tighten policy scan: hook scope, telemetry, disclosure; make blocking

policy/prompt.md — adds Part 2 (hook scope and disclosure):
- Enumerate every registered hook and read its source.
- Flag has_broad_scope_hooks when UserPromptSubmit/PreToolUse/
  PostToolUse runs without a project-relevance gate, or any hook
  reads user data beyond the plugin's stated scope — regardless of
  whether it makes network calls.
- Flag has_undisclosed_telemetry when any hook or shipped code calls
  a non-MCP host without explicit disclosure + opt-out.
- Flag description_matches_behavior=false when the install
  description would not lead a reasonable user to expect the
  hooks/telemetry/data-access found.
- passes=false when any of the above trip. Violations must cite the
  specific hook/file and what the user wasn't told.

The bar is now "handles user data responsibly," not merely "isn't
malicious." A non-malicious plugin that observes more than its stated
purpose justifies will fail.

policy/schema.json — adds required hooks[], has_broad_scope_hooks,
has_undisclosed_telemetry, description_matches_behavior.

scan-plugins.yml:
- fail-on-findings: true (blocking — loosen later if FP rate too high)
- workflow_dispatch with scan_all input for full re-review of all
  external entries
- timeout-minutes: 360 (full scan of 117 entries at ~96s each ≈ 3h)
- trigger on .github/policy/** so prompt edits get scanned

* Bump vercel SHA to test the tightened scan against it</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs (#1762)</title>
<updated>2026-05-07T19:18:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobin South</name>
<email>tobin.south@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-07T19:18:52+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=95cc50d13265e263c8a5365d87f5d69152fa3b6e'/>
<id>95cc50d13265e263c8a5365d87f5d69152fa3b6e</id>
<content type='text'>
* Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs

Replaces the hand-rolled marketplace validator and bot-based bump
workflow with the shared composite actions (pinned at f846a0b).

marketplace.json:
- 62 external entries that were missing a `sha` are now pinned to
  their current upstream HEAD (resolved via git ls-remote).

Workflows:
- validate-plugins.yml: invariants I1-I11 + claude plugin validate +
  diff-gated clone-at-SHA validation of changed external entries.
  SHA-pin (I5) is a hard error. I8/I11 stay warnings until the 15
  known data issues (vendored dirs without manifests; one dotted
  name) are cleaned up.
- bump-plugin-shas.yml: bot-free weekly refresh. Validates each new
  SHA with claude plugin validate before opening one PR; works with
  the default GITHUB_TOKEN (contents:write + pull-requests:write).
- scan-plugins.yml: Claude policy scan of changed external entries.
  Non-blocking; graceful no-op if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY isn't set.

Removed:
- validate-marketplace.yml + the two TS helper scripts (superseded
  by step 11/20 of validate-plugins).

validate-frontmatter.yml is kept — it's complementary (targeted
checks on agent/skill/command files for in-repo plugins).

* Remove 5 external entries that fail validation at HEAD

Step 30 (clone at pinned SHA + claude plugin validate) fails for
these at their current HEAD:

  aiven                   Unrecognized key "logo" in plugin.json
  atlassian-forge-skills  skill YAML frontmatter parse error
  sagemaker-ai            skill YAML frontmatter parse error
  speakai                 no plugin manifest at repo root
  stagehand               no plugin manifest at repo root

These can be re-added once the upstream repos are fixed.

* Wire scan-plugins to the detailed policy prompt

Adds .github/policy/prompt.md and schema.json (the full security
review rubric — malicious code, privacy, deception, safety
circumvention, exfiltration; plus network-call and software-install
flags) and points scan-plugins at it via the policy-prompt input.

With ANTHROPIC_API_KEY now configured on the repo, scan-plugins runs
the actual policy review on changed external entries instead of
no-op'ing.

* Bump scan-plugins action pin to include L11/L12 fixes</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs

Replaces the hand-rolled marketplace validator and bot-based bump
workflow with the shared composite actions (pinned at f846a0b).

marketplace.json:
- 62 external entries that were missing a `sha` are now pinned to
  their current upstream HEAD (resolved via git ls-remote).

Workflows:
- validate-plugins.yml: invariants I1-I11 + claude plugin validate +
  diff-gated clone-at-SHA validation of changed external entries.
  SHA-pin (I5) is a hard error. I8/I11 stay warnings until the 15
  known data issues (vendored dirs without manifests; one dotted
  name) are cleaned up.
- bump-plugin-shas.yml: bot-free weekly refresh. Validates each new
  SHA with claude plugin validate before opening one PR; works with
  the default GITHUB_TOKEN (contents:write + pull-requests:write).
- scan-plugins.yml: Claude policy scan of changed external entries.
  Non-blocking; graceful no-op if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY isn't set.

Removed:
- validate-marketplace.yml + the two TS helper scripts (superseded
  by step 11/20 of validate-plugins).

validate-frontmatter.yml is kept — it's complementary (targeted
checks on agent/skill/command files for in-repo plugins).

* Remove 5 external entries that fail validation at HEAD

Step 30 (clone at pinned SHA + claude plugin validate) fails for
these at their current HEAD:

  aiven                   Unrecognized key "logo" in plugin.json
  atlassian-forge-skills  skill YAML frontmatter parse error
  sagemaker-ai            skill YAML frontmatter parse error
  speakai                 no plugin manifest at repo root
  stagehand               no plugin manifest at repo root

These can be re-added once the upstream repos are fixed.

* Wire scan-plugins to the detailed policy prompt

Adds .github/policy/prompt.md and schema.json (the full security
review rubric — malicious code, privacy, deception, safety
circumvention, exfiltration; plus network-call and software-install
flags) and points scan-plugins at it via the policy-prompt input.

With ANTHROPIC_API_KEY now configured on the repo, scan-plugins runs
the actual policy review on changed external entries instead of
no-op'ing.

* Bump scan-plugins action pin to include L11/L12 fixes</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
