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<title>claude-plugins-official.git/.github/workflows, branch bump/stackhawk-api</title>
<subtitle>Official Claude Code plugin directory
</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check (#6296)</title>
<updated>2026-09-28T13:14:38+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Tobin South</name>
<email>tobin.south@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-28T13:14:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=fbe07fb6ce7d51d8e86ca6efdf050059894cdb80'/>
<id>fbe07fb6ce7d51d8e86ca6efdf050059894cdb80</id>
<content type='text'>
* Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check

Command sources have no repo URL to validate, so the guard no longer fails a non-member PR that adds one.

Remote-Dev: homespace

* Flag unvalidated command sources in scope guard output

Report command-source entries the guard skipped and stop the pass message from claiming every added entry came from a live repo.

Remote-Dev: homespace</content>
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<pre>
* Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check

Command sources have no repo URL to validate, so the guard no longer fails a non-member PR that adds one.

Remote-Dev: homespace

* Flag unvalidated command sources in scope guard output

Report command-source entries the guard skipped and stop the pass message from claiming every added entry came from a live repo.

Remote-Dev: homespace</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>context7: tag the remote MCP URL with client=claude-code-plugin (+ validate path fix) (#5823)</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T18:54:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jordanecker-ant</name>
<email>jordanecker@anthropic.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-08T18:54:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=bc875e80bee06bf11bd28cfc2fdf9ee563d3d2d7'/>
<id>bc875e80bee06bf11bd28cfc2fdf9ee563d3d2d7</id>
<content type='text'>
* context7: tag the remote MCP URL with client=claude-code-plugin

* validate: also trigger on vendored plugins' .mcp.json and hooks changes</content>
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<pre>
* context7: tag the remote MCP URL with client=claude-code-plugin

* validate: also trigger on vendored plugins' .mcp.json and hooks changes</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Raise the nightly bump cap from 30 to 60 plugins</title>
<updated>2026-09-04T20:24:07+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>jordanecker-ant</name>
<email>jordanecker@anthropic.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-09-04T20:24:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=c18a71c0b398d3a318335ba9935dc45b0b3cfc14'/>
<id>c18a71c0b398d3a318335ba9935dc45b0b3cfc14</id>
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<pre>
</pre>
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</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ci(validate): match vendored plugins/*/ + external_plugins/*/ manifest and content paths (#5424)</title>
<updated>2026-08-18T16:16:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryan Thompson</name>
<email>238056179+bryan-anthropic@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-18T16:16:05+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=6a9addedccf592e324e8693ce85aebf4a5a5a618'/>
<id>6a9addedccf592e324e8693ce85aebf4a5a5a618</id>
<content type='text'>
The one-level patterns (*/.claude-plugin/** etc.) never match the vendored
two-level layout because * does not cross /, so a PR touching only
plugins/&lt;name&gt;/.claude-plugin/plugin.json never fires the required validate
check and blocks forever (PR #5416). Same per-level spell-out the filter
already uses for plugins/*/README.md and assets.</content>
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<pre>
The one-level patterns (*/.claude-plugin/** etc.) never match the vendored
two-level layout because * does not cross /, so a PR touching only
plugins/&lt;name&gt;/.claude-plugin/plugin.json never fires the required validate
check and blocks forever (PR #5416). Same per-level spell-out the filter
already uses for plugins/*/README.md and assets.</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>fix(ci): validate paths filter misses .github/bump-tracking.json (#5256)</title>
<updated>2026-08-13T16:53:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryan Thompson</name>
<email>238056179+bryan-anthropic@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-13T16:53:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=ff9f97e6beb42008d43bd1efb339b0758ad268a4'/>
<id>ff9f97e6beb42008d43bd1efb339b0758ad268a4</id>
<content type='text'>
A PR that only edits .github/bump-tracking.json matched none of the
validate workflow's pull_request paths, so the required check sat
"Expected - Waiting for status to be reported" forever and the PR could
never merge. A workflow_dispatch run on the PR head does not satisfy the
gate either, since the merge box only counts pull_request check suites.

Same class already fixed in this file for .github/workflows/**,
.github/policy/**, and plugin README/asset paths.</content>
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<pre>
A PR that only edits .github/bump-tracking.json matched none of the
validate workflow's pull_request paths, so the required check sat
"Expected - Waiting for status to be reported" forever and the PR could
never merge. A workflow_dispatch run on the PR head does not satisfy the
gate either, since the merge box only counts pull_request check suites.

Same class already fixed in this file for .github/workflows/**,
.github/policy/**, and plugin README/asset paths.</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ci(validate-licenses): exempt intentionally-proprietary claude-security from the Apache-2.0 content check (#4942)</title>
<updated>2026-08-06T23:35:01+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryan Thompson</name>
<email>238056179+bryan-anthropic@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-06T23:35:01+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=d72880f9c858cf267eadbde34d57ffb87a0fc68e'/>
<id>d72880f9c858cf267eadbde34d57ffb87a0fc68e</id>
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<pre>
</pre>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>bump tracking: pin action to community 9247660a + releases-only for CrowdStrike entries (#4879)</title>
<updated>2026-08-04T22:07:48+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryan Thompson</name>
<email>238056179+bryan-anthropic@users.noreply.github.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-04T22:07:48+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=633fdfa4026c60fc5c890cf57b8c42817fe6b620'/>
<id>633fdfa4026c60fc5c890cf57b8c42817fe6b620</id>
<content type='text'>
Pin the bump action to community 9247660a (anthropics/claude-plugins-community#1715:
releases-only tracking via the new optional tracking-config input) and enroll the two
CrowdStrike entries — their pins now follow published release tags, not main HEAD.
All other entries HEAD-track exactly as before.</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
Pin the bump action to community 9247660a (anthropics/claude-plugins-community#1715:
releases-only tracking via the new optional tracking-config input) and enroll the two
CrowdStrike entries — their pins now follow published release tags, not main HEAD.
All other entries HEAD-track exactly as before.</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>receipts: show a sample receipt in the README (#4295)</title>
<updated>2026-07-21T00:05:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Morgan Lunt</name>
<email>morganl@anthropic.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-21T00:05:45+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=b822a2974dfbbd2544308e3c1cd4cb26d144589b'/>
<id>b822a2974dfbbd2544308e3c1cd4cb26d144589b</id>
<content type='text'>
You can't tell what this produces from a description, and the obvious
way to show it — screenshot a real run — would put someone's actual repo
names in a public README.

So the sample is generated: assets/make-sample.mjs builds a throwaway
HOME of invented repos, invented files and invented sessions, and the
real miner runs against that. The picture is what the tool genuinely
produces, from data that never existed. The generator ships next to the
asset so the next person can regenerate rather than edit a screenshot.

Also widen validate's path filter. It's a required check, so a PR that
only touches a plugin's README or assets matched no pattern, never
reported, and could not be merged — the same trap the workflow-file and
policy-file entries above already work around. Adding the plugin doc
paths lets this PR (and the next one) clear the gate on its own.

No-Verification-Needed: docs asset, dev-only generator, and CI trigger paths — no plugin runtime surface</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
You can't tell what this produces from a description, and the obvious
way to show it — screenshot a real run — would put someone's actual repo
names in a public README.

So the sample is generated: assets/make-sample.mjs builds a throwaway
HOME of invented repos, invented files and invented sessions, and the
real miner runs against that. The picture is what the tool genuinely
produces, from data that never existed. The generator ships next to the
asset so the next person can regenerate rather than edit a screenshot.

Also widen validate's path filter. It's a required check, so a PR that
only touches a plugin's README or assets matched no pattern, never
reported, and could not be merged — the same trap the workflow-file and
policy-file entries above already work around. Adding the plugin doc
paths lets this PR (and the next one) clear the gate on its own.

No-Verification-Needed: docs asset, dev-only generator, and CI trigger paths — no plugin runtime surface</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>validate-licenses: also verify LICENSE content is Apache 2.0 (#3633)</title>
<updated>2026-07-04T00:19:31+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Noah Zweben</name>
<email>noahz@anthropic.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-04T00:19:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=8326199c6ec61fdcece33199b61bdaa4f9ae1570'/>
<id>8326199c6ec61fdcece33199b61bdaa4f9ae1570</id>
<content type='text'>
The existing check only verified that a LICENSE file exists in each
plugins/ directory. Extend it to also grep for 'Apache License' and
'Version 2.0' so that a placeholder or wrong-license file is caught
at PR time rather than silently passing.

Co-authored-by: Claude &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
The existing check only verified that a LICENSE file exists in each
plugins/ directory. Extend it to also grep for 'Apache License' and
'Version 2.0' so that a placeholder or wrong-license file is caught
at PR time rather than silently passing.

Co-authored-by: Claude &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;</pre>
</div>
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>policy(scan): review whole payload incl. .claude/ + flag cross-service credential routing (#2360)</title>
<updated>2026-07-01T00:58:10+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Bryan Thompson</name>
<email>bthompson@anthropic.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-01T00:58:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/claude-plugins-official.git/commit/?id=317b8988055b151b694d4e06e5039b3f38dbe425'/>
<id>317b8988055b151b694d4e06e5039b3f38dbe425</id>
<content type='text'>
* policy(scan): review whole payload incl .claude/ + flag credential extraction

The review rubric anchored "read every relevant file" to the loaded plugin
surface (skills/*/SKILL.md, hook-referenced source) and checked credential
reads (~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials) only within hooks. Code that reads the user's
live secrets from a non-loaded location — e.g. a dotdir like .claude/ that still
ships to the user's disk on a git-source install — could fall through both.

Two fixes:
- Scope: direct the reviewer to read the WHOLE shipped payload incl. dotdirs
  like .claude/ (clones to disk, agent-reachable though not auto-loaded).
- Detector: add an explicit credential/secret-extraction check across ALL
  shipped code (not just hooks), naming OS credential-store CLIs + token
  harvest, with the set-your-own-key vs harvest trust-boundary distinction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* policy(scan): scope credential-extraction flag to CROSS-service routing (cut same-service FPs)

A full faithful scan of all 159 -official url-source plugins surfaced false
positives: the credential clause flagged plugins that use the user's OWN
service token to call that SAME service (e.g. a Railway plugin reading the
Railway CLI token to call Railway; a gcloud token used against Google) — normal
integration behavior. The "flag even if the destination is the vendor's own
service" wording inverted the right rule.

Corrected: flag only CROSS-service routing — a credential for service A sent to
a DIFFERENT service or third party (the vercel-style misuse: Anthropic's
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN routed to a non-Anthropic endpoint). Same-service use
(token for X used to call X) is explicitly NOT a violation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* policy(scan): judge credential ownership by NAME/source, not plugin-claimed use

Refines the cross-service rule after the full -official re-validation showed the
prior wording let a plugin pass by *claiming* an ANTHROPIC_*-named token was
"its gateway key." Now: which service a credential belongs to is judged by its
NAME / storage location (ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN =&gt; Anthropic; ~/.railway/config.json
=&gt; Railway; ~/.aws/credentials =&gt; AWS), NOT by how the plugin repurposes it. So
reading an ANTHROPIC_*-named token and routing it to a non-Anthropic endpoint is
cross-service (flag) even if the code treats it as a gateway key; same-service
use (Railway token -&gt; Railway) still passes. Catches the wrong-credential-class
trust-boundary breach while preserving the same-service FP fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* ci(validate): trigger on .github/policy/** so policy-prompt PRs clear the required check

A PR touching only .github/policy/** matched none of the validate
pull_request paths, so the required 'validate' check never ran via
pull_request and sat Expected forever (a workflow_dispatch check run
isn't associated with the PR, so it can't satisfy the gate). Mirrors
the existing .github/workflows/** carve-out.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;</content>
<content type='xhtml'>
<div xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml'>
<pre>
* policy(scan): review whole payload incl .claude/ + flag credential extraction

The review rubric anchored "read every relevant file" to the loaded plugin
surface (skills/*/SKILL.md, hook-referenced source) and checked credential
reads (~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials) only within hooks. Code that reads the user's
live secrets from a non-loaded location — e.g. a dotdir like .claude/ that still
ships to the user's disk on a git-source install — could fall through both.

Two fixes:
- Scope: direct the reviewer to read the WHOLE shipped payload incl. dotdirs
  like .claude/ (clones to disk, agent-reachable though not auto-loaded).
- Detector: add an explicit credential/secret-extraction check across ALL
  shipped code (not just hooks), naming OS credential-store CLIs + token
  harvest, with the set-your-own-key vs harvest trust-boundary distinction.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* policy(scan): scope credential-extraction flag to CROSS-service routing (cut same-service FPs)

A full faithful scan of all 159 -official url-source plugins surfaced false
positives: the credential clause flagged plugins that use the user's OWN
service token to call that SAME service (e.g. a Railway plugin reading the
Railway CLI token to call Railway; a gcloud token used against Google) — normal
integration behavior. The "flag even if the destination is the vendor's own
service" wording inverted the right rule.

Corrected: flag only CROSS-service routing — a credential for service A sent to
a DIFFERENT service or third party (the vercel-style misuse: Anthropic's
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN routed to a non-Anthropic endpoint). Same-service use
(token for X used to call X) is explicitly NOT a violation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* policy(scan): judge credential ownership by NAME/source, not plugin-claimed use

Refines the cross-service rule after the full -official re-validation showed the
prior wording let a plugin pass by *claiming* an ANTHROPIC_*-named token was
"its gateway key." Now: which service a credential belongs to is judged by its
NAME / storage location (ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN =&gt; Anthropic; ~/.railway/config.json
=&gt; Railway; ~/.aws/credentials =&gt; AWS), NOT by how the plugin repurposes it. So
reading an ANTHROPIC_*-named token and routing it to a non-Anthropic endpoint is
cross-service (flag) even if the code treats it as a gateway key; same-service
use (Railway token -&gt; Railway) still passes. Catches the wrong-credential-class
trust-boundary breach while preserving the same-service FP fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;

* ci(validate): trigger on .github/policy/** so policy-prompt PRs clear the required check

A PR touching only .github/policy/** matched none of the validate
pull_request paths, so the required 'validate' check never ran via
pull_request and sat Expected forever (a workflow_dispatch check run
isn't associated with the PR, so it can't satisfy the gate). Mirrors
the existing .github/workflows/** carve-out.

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) &lt;noreply@anthropic.com&gt;</pre>
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</content>
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