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authorMorgan Lunt <morganl@anthropic.com>2026-05-11 16:46:03 -0700
committerMorgan Lunt <morganl@anthropic.com>2026-05-11 16:46:03 -0700
commit5e4a45001d608ce34437181d96340faa1f5899c9 (patch)
treebc7c7793c38957f6bb2a656c359e1e755cfba2fd /plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md
parent22a1b2597750246f104c88e66f0c379932d05c9b (diff)
code-modernization: harden writes a patch instead of editing legacy; make map/security guidance language-agnosticmorganl/code-modernization-plugin
- modernize-harden: never edits legacy/ anymore. Writes findings plus a reviewed unified diff to analysis/<system>/security_remediation.patch. A second security-auditor pass reviews each hunk (RESOLVES / PARTIAL / INTRODUCES-RISK) before presenting. The user reviews and applies the patch deliberately, then re-runs to verify. This makes every command consistent with the recommended deny Edit(legacy/**) workspace setting, so the README's exception note is gone. - modernize-map: restructure the parse-target list around three stack- agnostic principles (dispatcher targets are variables; code-storage joins live in config; entry points live in deployment descriptors), with COBOL/Java/web/CLI examples on equal footing rather than COBOL-dominant. Same protections against false dead-code findings, less stack-specific. - security-auditor agent: rephrase coverage items in stack-neutral terms (record layouts/temp datasets, resource ACLs, deployment scripts/job definitions, batch input records) so the checklist reads naturally for COBOL, Java EE, .NET, and web targets alike. - README: drop the harden exception note; describe the patch workflow.
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@@ -11,28 +11,29 @@ engineer can fix.
## Coverage checklist
-Adapt to the target stack — web items don't apply to a batch COBOL system,
-mainframe items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant:
+Adapt to the target stack — web items don't apply to a batch system,
+terminal/screen items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant:
-- **Injection** (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template, dynamic
- DB2 SQL, JCL/PARM injection) — trace every user-controlled input to every sink
+- **Injection** (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template) — trace every
+ user-controlled input to every sink, including dynamic SQL and shell-outs
- **Authentication / session** — hardcoded creds, weak session handling,
- missing auth checks on sensitive routes/transactions
-- **Sensitive data exposure** — secrets in source, weak crypto, PII/PAN/SSN in
- logs, cleartext data in copybooks/flat files
+ missing auth checks on sensitive routes/transactions/jobs
+- **Sensitive data exposure** — secrets in source, weak crypto, PII in logs,
+ cleartext sensitive data in record layouts, flat files, or temp datasets
- **Access control** — IDOR, missing ownership checks, privilege escalation;
- for CICS: missing/permissive RACF transaction & resource definitions,
- unguarded admin transactions
-- **XSS / CSRF** — unescaped output, missing tokens (web targets only)
-- **Insecure deserialization** — pickle/yaml.load/ObjectInputStream on
- untrusted data
+ missing/permissive resource ACLs (RACF profiles, IAM policies, file perms);
+ unguarded admin functions
+- **XSS / CSRF** — unescaped output, missing tokens (web targets)
+- **Insecure deserialization** — untrusted data into pickle/yaml.load/
+ `ObjectInputStream` or custom record parsers
- **Vulnerable dependencies** — run `npm audit` / `pip-audit` /
read manifests and flag versions with known CVEs
-- **SSRF / path traversal / open redirect** (web targets only)
-- **Input validation** — for CICS/3270: unvalidated BMS field input,
- missing length/range/format checks before file/DB writes
+- **SSRF / path traversal / open redirect** (web/network targets)
+- **Input validation** — missing length/range/format checks at trust
+ boundaries (form/screen fields, API params, batch input records) before
+ persistence or downstream calls
- **Security misconfiguration** — debug mode, verbose errors, default creds,
- hardcoded passwords/userids in JCL, PROCs, or sign-on programs
+ hardcoded credentials in deployment scripts, job definitions, or config
## Tooling