diff options
| author | Morgan Lunt <morganl@anthropic.com> | 2026-05-11 16:46:03 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Morgan Lunt <morganl@anthropic.com> | 2026-05-11 16:46:03 -0700 |
| commit | 5e4a45001d608ce34437181d96340faa1f5899c9 (patch) | |
| tree | bc7c7793c38957f6bb2a656c359e1e755cfba2fd /plugins/code-modernization/agents | |
| parent | 22a1b2597750246f104c88e66f0c379932d05c9b (diff) | |
code-modernization: harden writes a patch instead of editing legacy; make map/security guidance language-agnosticmorganl/code-modernization-plugin
- modernize-harden: never edits legacy/ anymore. Writes findings plus a
reviewed unified diff to analysis/<system>/security_remediation.patch.
A second security-auditor pass reviews each hunk (RESOLVES / PARTIAL /
INTRODUCES-RISK) before presenting. The user reviews and applies the
patch deliberately, then re-runs to verify. This makes every command
consistent with the recommended deny Edit(legacy/**) workspace setting,
so the README's exception note is gone.
- modernize-map: restructure the parse-target list around three stack-
agnostic principles (dispatcher targets are variables; code-storage
joins live in config; entry points live in deployment descriptors), with
COBOL/Java/web/CLI examples on equal footing rather than COBOL-dominant.
Same protections against false dead-code findings, less stack-specific.
- security-auditor agent: rephrase coverage items in stack-neutral terms
(record layouts/temp datasets, resource ACLs, deployment scripts/job
definitions, batch input records) so the checklist reads naturally for
COBOL, Java EE, .NET, and web targets alike.
- README: drop the harden exception note; describe the patch workflow.
Diffstat (limited to 'plugins/code-modernization/agents')
| -rw-r--r-- | plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md | 33 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md b/plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md index e33ee940..f1b291db 100644 --- a/plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md +++ b/plugins/code-modernization/agents/security-auditor.md @@ -11,28 +11,29 @@ engineer can fix. ## Coverage checklist -Adapt to the target stack — web items don't apply to a batch COBOL system, -mainframe items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant: +Adapt to the target stack — web items don't apply to a batch system, +terminal/screen items don't apply to a SPA. Work through what's relevant: -- **Injection** (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template, dynamic - DB2 SQL, JCL/PARM injection) — trace every user-controlled input to every sink +- **Injection** (SQL, NoSQL, OS command, LDAP, XPath, template) — trace every + user-controlled input to every sink, including dynamic SQL and shell-outs - **Authentication / session** — hardcoded creds, weak session handling, - missing auth checks on sensitive routes/transactions -- **Sensitive data exposure** — secrets in source, weak crypto, PII/PAN/SSN in - logs, cleartext data in copybooks/flat files + missing auth checks on sensitive routes/transactions/jobs +- **Sensitive data exposure** — secrets in source, weak crypto, PII in logs, + cleartext sensitive data in record layouts, flat files, or temp datasets - **Access control** — IDOR, missing ownership checks, privilege escalation; - for CICS: missing/permissive RACF transaction & resource definitions, - unguarded admin transactions -- **XSS / CSRF** — unescaped output, missing tokens (web targets only) -- **Insecure deserialization** — pickle/yaml.load/ObjectInputStream on - untrusted data + missing/permissive resource ACLs (RACF profiles, IAM policies, file perms); + unguarded admin functions +- **XSS / CSRF** — unescaped output, missing tokens (web targets) +- **Insecure deserialization** — untrusted data into pickle/yaml.load/ + `ObjectInputStream` or custom record parsers - **Vulnerable dependencies** — run `npm audit` / `pip-audit` / read manifests and flag versions with known CVEs -- **SSRF / path traversal / open redirect** (web targets only) -- **Input validation** — for CICS/3270: unvalidated BMS field input, - missing length/range/format checks before file/DB writes +- **SSRF / path traversal / open redirect** (web/network targets) +- **Input validation** — missing length/range/format checks at trust + boundaries (form/screen fields, API params, batch input records) before + persistence or downstream calls - **Security misconfiguration** — debug mode, verbose errors, default creds, - hardcoded passwords/userids in JCL, PROCs, or sign-on programs + hardcoded credentials in deployment scripts, job definitions, or config ## Tooling |
