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2026-11-05ci(validate-plugins): re-pin validator and allow the xcode command source ↵Chaoshuai Lyu
(#7015) Squash merge of 2 commits
2026-09-28Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check (#6296)Tobin South
* Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check Command sources have no repo URL to validate, so the guard no longer fails a non-member PR that adds one. Remote-Dev: homespace * Flag unvalidated command sources in scope guard output Report command-source entries the guard skipped and stop the pass message from claiming every added entry came from a live repo. Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-09-08context7: tag the remote MCP URL with client=claude-code-plugin (+ validate ↵jordanecker-ant
path fix) (#5823) * context7: tag the remote MCP URL with client=claude-code-plugin * validate: also trigger on vendored plugins' .mcp.json and hooks changes
2026-09-04Raise the nightly bump cap from 30 to 60 pluginsjordan/raise-bump-capjordanecker-ant
2026-08-18ci(validate): match vendored plugins/*/ + external_plugins/*/ manifest and ↵Bryan Thompson
content paths (#5424) The one-level patterns (*/.claude-plugin/** etc.) never match the vendored two-level layout because * does not cross /, so a PR touching only plugins/<name>/.claude-plugin/plugin.json never fires the required validate check and blocks forever (PR #5416). Same per-level spell-out the filter already uses for plugins/*/README.md and assets.
2026-08-13fix(ci): validate paths filter misses .github/bump-tracking.json (#5256)Bryan Thompson
A PR that only edits .github/bump-tracking.json matched none of the validate workflow's pull_request paths, so the required check sat "Expected - Waiting for status to be reported" forever and the PR could never merge. A workflow_dispatch run on the PR head does not satisfy the gate either, since the merge box only counts pull_request check suites. Same class already fixed in this file for .github/workflows/**, .github/policy/**, and plugin README/asset paths.
2026-08-06ci(validate-licenses): exempt intentionally-proprietary claude-security from ↵Bryan Thompson
the Apache-2.0 content check (#4942)
2026-08-04bump tracking: pin action to community 9247660a + releases-only for ↵Bryan Thompson
CrowdStrike entries (#4879) Pin the bump action to community 9247660a (anthropics/claude-plugins-community#1715: releases-only tracking via the new optional tracking-config input) and enroll the two CrowdStrike entries — their pins now follow published release tags, not main HEAD. All other entries HEAD-track exactly as before.
2026-07-20receipts: show a sample receipt in the README (#4295)Morgan Lunt
You can't tell what this produces from a description, and the obvious way to show it — screenshot a real run — would put someone's actual repo names in a public README. So the sample is generated: assets/make-sample.mjs builds a throwaway HOME of invented repos, invented files and invented sessions, and the real miner runs against that. The picture is what the tool genuinely produces, from data that never existed. The generator ships next to the asset so the next person can regenerate rather than edit a screenshot. Also widen validate's path filter. It's a required check, so a PR that only touches a plugin's README or assets matched no pattern, never reported, and could not be merged — the same trap the workflow-file and policy-file entries above already work around. Adding the plugin doc paths lets this PR (and the next one) clear the gate on its own. No-Verification-Needed: docs asset, dev-only generator, and CI trigger paths — no plugin runtime surface
2026-07-03validate-licenses: also verify LICENSE content is Apache 2.0 (#3633)Noah Zweben
The existing check only verified that a LICENSE file exists in each plugins/ directory. Extend it to also grep for 'Apache License' and 'Version 2.0' so that a placeholder or wrong-license file is caught at PR time rather than silently passing. Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-30policy(scan): review whole payload incl. .claude/ + flag cross-service ↵Bryan Thompson
credential routing (#2360) * policy(scan): review whole payload incl .claude/ + flag credential extraction The review rubric anchored "read every relevant file" to the loaded plugin surface (skills/*/SKILL.md, hook-referenced source) and checked credential reads (~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials) only within hooks. Code that reads the user's live secrets from a non-loaded location — e.g. a dotdir like .claude/ that still ships to the user's disk on a git-source install — could fall through both. Two fixes: - Scope: direct the reviewer to read the WHOLE shipped payload incl. dotdirs like .claude/ (clones to disk, agent-reachable though not auto-loaded). - Detector: add an explicit credential/secret-extraction check across ALL shipped code (not just hooks), naming OS credential-store CLIs + token harvest, with the set-your-own-key vs harvest trust-boundary distinction. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * policy(scan): scope credential-extraction flag to CROSS-service routing (cut same-service FPs) A full faithful scan of all 159 -official url-source plugins surfaced false positives: the credential clause flagged plugins that use the user's OWN service token to call that SAME service (e.g. a Railway plugin reading the Railway CLI token to call Railway; a gcloud token used against Google) — normal integration behavior. The "flag even if the destination is the vendor's own service" wording inverted the right rule. Corrected: flag only CROSS-service routing — a credential for service A sent to a DIFFERENT service or third party (the vercel-style misuse: Anthropic's ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN routed to a non-Anthropic endpoint). Same-service use (token for X used to call X) is explicitly NOT a violation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * policy(scan): judge credential ownership by NAME/source, not plugin-claimed use Refines the cross-service rule after the full -official re-validation showed the prior wording let a plugin pass by *claiming* an ANTHROPIC_*-named token was "its gateway key." Now: which service a credential belongs to is judged by its NAME / storage location (ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN => Anthropic; ~/.railway/config.json => Railway; ~/.aws/credentials => AWS), NOT by how the plugin repurposes it. So reading an ANTHROPIC_*-named token and routing it to a non-Anthropic endpoint is cross-service (flag) even if the code treats it as a gateway key; same-service use (Railway token -> Railway) still passes. Catches the wrong-credential-class trust-boundary breach while preserving the same-service FP fix. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci(validate): trigger on .github/policy/** so policy-prompt PRs clear the required check A PR touching only .github/policy/** matched none of the validate pull_request paths, so the required 'validate' check never ran via pull_request and sat Expected forever (a workflow_dispatch check run isn't associated with the PR, so it can't satisfy the gate). Mirrors the existing .github/workflows/** carve-out. --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard (#3402)Bryan Thompson
* Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard The External PR Scope Guard (#3353) and the auto-closer both look up the PR author's collaborator permission and, for anyone who is not write/admin, require the PR to ADD marketplace.json entries (additions-only). Internal bump PRs are authored by github-actions[bot], which is not reported as a member, so a SHA-bump — a legitimate MODIFY of an existing entry — fails the guard (e.g. #3391 "modifies existing entry: astronomer-data-agents"). Add a shared isExemptAuthor() helper that exempts both org members and the repo's own automation bot, and route both workflows through it. Safe under pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot author as github-actions[bot] (only the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow can), and the member path is still a real permission lookup. The helper also wraps getCollaboratorPermissionLevel in try/catch — previously a non-collaborator/unknown-user lookup threw and errored the job instead of falling through to scope evaluation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Correct stale "required status check" guidance in scope-guard comments The scope guard is advisory, not a required status check — the merge gate is validate + scan + a maintainer approval. The old header told operators to add it to branch protection, which is now contra-indicated (it would block the no-approval bump-merge path). Update both workflow comments to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25Allow non-member PRs scoped to an already-listed plugin repo (#3353)Bryan Thompson
* feat(ci): allow live external contributors to open scoped PRs Add an opt-in allowlist so a vetted external developer who already has a plugin live in this marketplace — but cannot use the submission form (e.g. an enterprise partner without a Claude account) — can open a reviewable PR instead of having it auto-closed. - .github/external-contributors.json: username -> allowed_sources map (doubles as the allowlist and the per-author source scope). - close-external-prs.yml: skip the auto-close for allowlisted authors (reads the list from the trusted base checkout). Grants ONLY the right to open a PR; CI + maintainer approval are unchanged. - external-pr-scope-guard.yml: required check for allowlisted external authors. Fails unless the PR touches ONLY marketplace.json and the delta is additions-only, with every added entry's source.url under that author's allowed_sources. Anthropic members are unrestricted. Reads head marketplace.json as data via the API (no untrusted checkout). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ci): neutral wording in external-contributors allowlist note Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ci): key external-PR allowlist on source org, not individuals Replace the per-username allowlist with a source-org allowlist so no individual is named in the repo. A non-member PR stays open only if it adds marketplace.json entries whose source.url is under an allowlisted prefix and changes nothing else; merge still requires CI + maintainer approval. - external-pr-allowed-sources.json: flat allowed_sources prefixes (no usernames) - scripts/external-pr-scope.js: shared additions-only / allowed-source logic - close-external-prs.yml + external-pr-scope-guard.yml: both use the shared module Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ci): derive external-PR scope from live repos, no maintained list Replace the curated source-org allowlist with auto-derivation from the live marketplace. A non-member PR stays open only if it ADDS entries whose source.url repo ALREADY backs a live plugin here, additions-only, nothing else touched. No list to maintain, no individuals named. Trust is anchored in the source repo + pinned SHA (org-controlled), not the submitter's identity; merge still requires CI + maintainer approval. - remove external-pr-allowed-sources.json - scripts/external-pr-scope.js: derive allowed repos from base marketplace.json - both workflows drop the allowlist-file arg Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): diff external-PR scope against the merge-base, not base tip Comparing base-branch-tip -> head made a fork that is behind main report all of main's later additions as phantom removals/modifications, which would wrongly fail the scope guard for a legitimate additions-only PR. Diff merge-base -> head (the PR's actual changes) instead; keep the "already live" check against the current base branch. Found by an end-to-end run of evaluate() against real PR data (#3298 stayed clean; #3044's phantom drift collapsed to its real one-line change). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19chore(ci): re-pin validate-plugins + scan-plugins + bump-plugin-shas to ↵Bryan Thompson
community 426e469f (#3132) * chore(bump-plugin-shas): re-pin to community 426e469f (subdir-existence guard #267) Picks up anthropics/claude-plugins-community#267 — guards subdir existence before manifest synthesis, so a strict:false external whose source.path subdir vanished at the new SHA is a clean "subdir not found" skip instead of a phantom synthesized manifest + false bump. Clean one-commit pull-forward from a27629fc. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(validate-plugins,scan-plugins): re-pin to community 426e469f Aligns all three shared community action pins on the same SHA (426e469f). The validate-plugins/scan-plugins actions are unchanged between d207465 and 426e469f (only bump-plugin-shas changed in #266/#267) — SHA-consistency, no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-19chore(bump-plugin-shas): pin to claude-plugins-community a27629fc + add ↵Bryan Thompson
single-plugin `plugin` dispatch target (#3126) Bumps the bump-plugin-shas action pin to the new claude-plugins-community SHA (a27629fc) which adds (1) manifest synthesis for strict:false skills-only externals — so they can finally be bumped instead of drifting — and (2) an `only` input to target ONE plugin on demand. Surfaces the targeting as a `plugin` workflow_dispatch input threaded into the action's `with:` block, so an operator can run: gh workflow run bump-plugin-shas.yml --repo anthropics/claude-plugins-official -f plugin=<name> (e.g. to bump the now-eligible netsuite-suitecloud, a strict:false entry the old action hard-skipped). Empty `plugin` = unchanged nightly behavior. The plugin->only->ONLY->bump.sh chain was reviewed (ultra) and e2e-verified live on claude-plugins-community before this pin bump. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-18ci: pin validate-plugins + scan-plugins + bump-plugin-shas to self-healing ↵Bryan Thompson
CLI install (#3095) * ci: bump validate-plugins action pin to self-healing CLI install Bumps the pinned validate-plugins action SHA (f846a0bc -> 5d75f99) to pick up two fixes already merged in claude-plugins-community: 1. Self-healing claude CLI install (community#233): the prior pin's install step was a bare `npm i -g @anthropic-ai/claude-code@latest && claude --version`, which intermittently stalled (a 28-min hang -> "native binary not installed") and jammed whichever bump PR caught it (e.g. desktop-commander #2985). The new step forces the optional native dep, verifies the binary, re-runs the postinstall on a miss, and bounds every network step with a timeout. 2. strict:false skills-only manifest synthesis: the prior pin hard-required a plugin.json for external git-subdir sources, false-failing skills-only entries that the marketplace server synthesizes a manifest for. This is what blocks #2997 (learn-with-coursera) and #2312 (netsuite-suitecloud) today; the bumped action synthesizes a minimal manifest for them instead. No other change. The action stays on claude-cli-version: latest. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: pin scan-plugins + bump-plugin-shas to self-healing action too Extend the validate-plugins pin bump (this PR) to the other two shared actions that install the claude CLI the same flaky way. All three now pin the same claude-plugins-community SHA (d207465) carrying the self-healing install (community#233 + #234): force the optional native dep, verify, re-run postinstall on a miss, timeout every network step, retry with real reinstalls. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * ci: run validate on workflow-file changes (fix required-check deadlock) A PR touching only .github/workflows/** (e.g. an action-SHA re-pin like this one) never matched validate-plugins.yml's pull_request path filter, so the required 'validate' check never ran and the PR sat 'Expected — Waiting for status to be reported' with no way to clear it (workflow_dispatch check runs aren't associated with the PR, so they don't satisfy the required check; the ruleset has no bypass actors). Add .github/workflows/** to the trigger so workflow-only PRs validate in-context and can clear the gate — and so this PR unblocks itself. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01bump: switch to per-entry PR mode (one PR per stale plugin) (#2051)Bryan Thompson
* bump: switch to per-entry PR mode (one PR per stale plugin) Replaces the single batched bump PR with one PR per stale plugin so a single failing plugin no longer blocks the rest. Pins to a feature branch of the bump-plugin-shas action that adds 'pr-mode: per-entry'; re-pin to the merge commit on the action's main when that lands. - pr-mode: per-entry → one PR per plugin on bump/<slug> - max_bumps default lowered 130 → 30 (per-entry scans cost more) - scan dispatch fanned out over pr-urls JSON (one per per-entry branch) - header comments updated for per-entry semantics * bump: re-pin to merged composite action SHA on -community main The pr-mode: per-entry input now lives on main of the bump-plugin-shas action (merged at e2019b2a). Update the pin and drop the now-stale header comment that tracked the feature branch. * bump: dispatch all three required checks per per-entry PR Bump PRs are opened with GITHUB_TOKEN, which doesn't fire on:pull_request (recursion guard). The per-entry cutover already dispatched scan-plugins.yml per branch to satisfy the `scan` required check, but `check` (Check MCP URLs) and `validate` (Validate Plugins) are also required on main and likewise never fired — leaving every bump PR BLOCKED on missing checks (observed on the batched #2079, which only cleared after a human-authored push re-fired the pull_request workflows). Fix: dispatch all three workflows per per-entry bump branch. Each runs its job unconditionally on workflow_dispatch, so the check run lands on the branch HEAD (= PR head) and satisfies the required check. - validate-plugins.yml: add workflow_dispatch trigger (check-mcp-urls.yml already had one). gh workflow run requires the trigger on the default branch; this lands together with the per-entry bump so main stays consistent. - bump-plugin-shas.yml: loop the dispatch over {scan-plugins,check-mcp-urls,validate-plugins}; tolerate a single transient dispatch failure (warn, don't abort) so one hiccup can't strand the rest of the batch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * bump: fail the per-entry check-dispatch step when a dispatch fails The dispatch step logged each failed gh workflow run as a warning and exited 0, so a transient API error or rate limit could leave a per-entry bump PR missing a required check while the bump run still showed green. The composite action skips slugs with an open PR, so the stranded PR was never retried. Attempt every dispatch (one failure must not strand the other branches), record failures via a temp file (the while loop runs in a pipe subshell), then emit an error and exit non-zero if any dispatch failed, so the bump run goes red and the affected PR can be re-dispatched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-28feat(scan): emit per-entry sticky verdict comments (#2009)Bryan Thompson
Adds an `emit-verdict` job to scan-plugins.yml that posts a sticky comment per scanned entry to the corresponding bump PR, with marker `<!-- bump-pr-verdict:<name> -->`. The body is a schema_v1 JSON block, the same shape `anthropics/claude-plugins-community-internal`'s `scan-external-plugins.yml` already emits, so any consumer that already reads verdicts from that schema works uniformly across both repos. What this enables ----------------- Lets downstream consumers (label automation, dashboards, anything that wants per-entry verdict signal) read verdicts directly from the PR rather than scraping job logs or downloading artifacts. The current options are log-scraping (truncated after log retention) or fetching the `scan-verdicts` artifact (retention-limited and only after upload succeeds). What does NOT change -------------------- - The `scan` required check is unaffected (emit-verdict is `continue-on-error: true` at the job level — failures here MUST NOT block the required gate). - Verdict cache, scan flow, and revert-failed-bumps.yml are unchanged. - No new permission scopes (uses `pull-requests: write` at the job level, identical to other PR-commenting jobs in this repo). Schema notes ------------ - `scan.*` axes (clone, schema, binaries, etc.) emit as "skipped" — this workflow runs the policy review only, not per-entry static checks. Shape kept compatible with -internal's schema_v1 so the same consumers work uniformly on both repos. - `policy.has_broad_scope_hooks`, `has_undisclosed_telemetry`, `description_matches_behavior` emit as null — those granular axes aren't surfaced by this workflow's per-entry artifact yet. Consumers that map `null → "?"` for display already handle this gracefully. - `policy.status` is execution state (not outcome). Map source → status: scan-action-run → "ran"; cache-served → "cached". Outcome lives in `policy.passes`. policy.status vocabulary matches the `ran|cached|missing|gated_out|infra_error` convention from -internal's emit-verdict. PR resolution ------------- `pull_request` events carry the PR number directly. The bump workflow creates bump PRs via GITHUB_TOKEN (which doesn't fire `pull_request` triggers — recursion guard) and dispatches this scan via `workflow_dispatch` on the bump branch; in that case the job looks up the open PR by head ref via REST. No PR found (scan_all dispatch on main, etc.) → no-op with notice. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-27ci: validate Apache 2.0 LICENSE file exists in every plugin (#2028)Noah Zweben
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24ci: migrate scan-plugins.yml to Workload Identity Federation auth (#1991)zenexer-ant
* ci: migrate scan-plugins.yml to Workload Identity Federation auth Replaces the static ANTHROPIC_API_KEY repo secret with Workload Identity Federation: the scan-plugins shared action mints a GitHub OIDC token (id-token: write) and the claude CLI exchanges it for a short-lived bearer. The federation rule is bound to this repository (repository_id-pinned). Depends on anthropics/claude-plugins-community#34 (adds the WIF inputs to the shared action). Pinned to that PR's head SHA; will re-pin to a main-branch SHA once #34 merges. Drops the 'Require ANTHROPIC_API_KEY' fail-closed guard — the WIF inputs are literal in this file, so the action's skip-if-no-auth path can't trigger. Updates the prompt-injection security comment to reflect the short-lived bearer model. * scan-plugins: re-pin to cpc#34 merge commit on main claude-plugins-community#34 merged at e85f0d65b4fc87f07862e1dcdc467950514414ec — re-pinning from the PR head SHA to the squash-merge commit on main so the pin survives any future branch GC.
2026-05-22Fix MCP URL probe: connection failure was reported as PASS (#1922)Tobin South
curl writes "000" to -w '%{http_code}' on a connection failure AND exits nonzero. The previous fallback put the echo inside the command substitution — both wrote, the captured value was "000000", and the case statement's 000) arm didn't match, so dead hosts fell through to PASS. Move the fallback assignment outside the substitution so the captured value is exactly "000" and connection failures fail. Also skip entries with an empty url field — those are placeholders awaiting user config, not dead endpoints, and would false-fail.
2026-05-18Raise bump cap with verdict cache and skip-and-revert (#1913)Tobin South
* Cache scan verdicts and drop policy-failing entries from bump PRs Three changes that together let the nightly bump clear any backlog in a single run without blocking on a single bad upstream or re-burning Claude time on already-scanned SHAs: - bump-plugin-shas.yml: raise max-bumps default 20 -> 130 (above the external entry count, so a single run can clear a full backlog) and add an explicit 60-min job timeout. The cap was the only thing bounding the blast radius of a single policy failure; the changes below take over that role so the cap can be lifted. - scan-plugins.yml: add a verdict cache keyed on (plugin, sha, policy hash). The bump action force-resets bump/plugin-shas every night, which makes the same SHAs reappear in the diff on consecutive nights — without the cache the scan would re-burn ~90s of Claude time per entry per night. Cached verdicts (pass and fail) are served from disk; only uncached SHAs are scanned. The job still fails on cached failures so the required check stays honest. - revert-failed-bumps.yml (new): after a Scan Plugins workflow_run on bump/plugin-shas concludes with a failure, drop just the failing entries' source.sha back to main's pin via a follow-up signed commit and re-dispatch the scan. The re-dispatch finds only cached-pass entries and goes green in seconds. Bounded at 3 passes/night, restricted to SHA-only diffs, and aborts if the bump branch was tampered with. * Harden bump cache and revert workflows after review - revert-failed-bumps: replace the time-based revert budget (anchored on the PR head, which a revert commit immediately replaces — never accumulating past 1) with a commit count: every nightly bump force- resets to one commit and every revert pass adds exactly one, so commits > MAX+1 is the budget without date math, pagination, or exposure to comment spoofing. - revert-failed-bumps: filter the bump PR by head owner so a fork PR with a branch named bump/plugin-shas can't be selected. - revert-failed-bumps: continue-on-error on the artifact download so a scan that died before uploading (infra error) doesn't fail the revert job — the missing-file guard downstream handles it. - scan-plugins: add a per-ref concurrency group so concurrent scans don't lose one another's cache writes; key the cache on run_attempt so a re-run can save its own verdicts. - scan-plugins: store the full source object in the cache and require source equality on lookup, so a repo/path change at the same SHA misses the cache instead of getting a stale verdict. - scan-plugins / revert-failed-bumps: strip markdown control chars, wrap model-generated text in code spans (neutralizes auto-linked URLs), and redact key-shaped tokens before they reach the step summary, artifact, cache, or PR comment.
2026-05-18Run plugin SHA bump nightly instead of weekly (#1909)Tobin South
Upstream plugins move daily; a weekly sweep with a 20-bump cap can fall behind. Each run force-resets the bump branch, so stale unmerged PRs are replaced rather than piling up.
2026-05-18Add CI check for HTTP MCP server URL liveness (#1910)Tobin South
Walks marketplace.json for vendored plugins, extracts http/sse MCP server URLs from .mcp.json / mcp.json / plugin.json, and probes each with HEAD then a JSON-RPC POST fallback. Fails on 404/410 and connection errors; passes on auth/method errors (expected without credentials). Runs on PR, daily schedule, and manual dispatch. External (SHA-pinned) plugins are out of scope — their .mcp.json isn't checked out here.
2026-05-11Make Scan Plugins a viable required check; auto-dispatch on bump PRs (#1815)Tobin South
Scan Plugins is meant to gate every change to marketplace.json, but two gaps made that unenforceable: 1. The bump workflow opens PRs with GITHUB_TOKEN, which GitHub exempts from on:pull_request triggers. Weekly bump PRs (e.g. #1809) get no scan check at all. 2. The workflow had a paths filter, so a required-check ruleset for `scan` would block every PR that doesn't touch marketplace.json (no check run = pending forever). Fixes: scan-plugins.yml - Drop the paths filter; replace with a step-level `git diff --quiet` early-exit on the same paths. The check now reports on every PR, which makes it safe to require. - Fail closed when ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is unset and a scan is needed. The shared action no-ops gracefully in that case (right default for community repos), but a required check that silently does nothing is a rubber stamp. bump-plugin-shas.yml - After the action opens the bump PR, `gh workflow run scan-plugins.yml --ref bump/plugin-shas`. workflow_dispatch is exempt from the GITHUB_TOKEN recursion guard, and the resulting check run lands on the branch HEAD (= PR head), so it satisfies the required check. - Add `actions: write` so the dispatch is allowed. Follow-up: add a repo ruleset on main requiring the `scan` check (integration: github-actions) once this merges.
2026-05-11Bump bump-plugin-shas action so bump commits are signed (#1814)Tobin South
The pinned version of anthropics/claude-plugins-community's bump-plugin-shas action creates the bump commit with a local git commit, which is unsigned and unmergeable under the required_signatures ruleset on main. The new SHA creates the commit via the GraphQL createCommitOnBranch mutation, which GitHub signs server-side, so weekly bump PRs (e.g. #1809) become mergeable.
2026-05-07Tighten policy scan: hook scope, telemetry, disclosure; make blocking (#1771)Tobin South
* Tighten policy scan: hook scope, telemetry, disclosure; make blocking policy/prompt.md — adds Part 2 (hook scope and disclosure): - Enumerate every registered hook and read its source. - Flag has_broad_scope_hooks when UserPromptSubmit/PreToolUse/ PostToolUse runs without a project-relevance gate, or any hook reads user data beyond the plugin's stated scope — regardless of whether it makes network calls. - Flag has_undisclosed_telemetry when any hook or shipped code calls a non-MCP host without explicit disclosure + opt-out. - Flag description_matches_behavior=false when the install description would not lead a reasonable user to expect the hooks/telemetry/data-access found. - passes=false when any of the above trip. Violations must cite the specific hook/file and what the user wasn't told. The bar is now "handles user data responsibly," not merely "isn't malicious." A non-malicious plugin that observes more than its stated purpose justifies will fail. policy/schema.json — adds required hooks[], has_broad_scope_hooks, has_undisclosed_telemetry, description_matches_behavior. scan-plugins.yml: - fail-on-findings: true (blocking — loosen later if FP rate too high) - workflow_dispatch with scan_all input for full re-review of all external entries - timeout-minutes: 360 (full scan of 117 entries at ~96s each ≈ 3h) - trigger on .github/policy/** so prompt edits get scanned * Bump vercel SHA to test the tightened scan against it
2026-05-07Pin GitHub Actions to commit SHAsdevsec/pin-actionsjportner
2026-05-07Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs (#1762)Tobin South
* Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs Replaces the hand-rolled marketplace validator and bot-based bump workflow with the shared composite actions (pinned at f846a0b). marketplace.json: - 62 external entries that were missing a `sha` are now pinned to their current upstream HEAD (resolved via git ls-remote). Workflows: - validate-plugins.yml: invariants I1-I11 + claude plugin validate + diff-gated clone-at-SHA validation of changed external entries. SHA-pin (I5) is a hard error. I8/I11 stay warnings until the 15 known data issues (vendored dirs without manifests; one dotted name) are cleaned up. - bump-plugin-shas.yml: bot-free weekly refresh. Validates each new SHA with claude plugin validate before opening one PR; works with the default GITHUB_TOKEN (contents:write + pull-requests:write). - scan-plugins.yml: Claude policy scan of changed external entries. Non-blocking; graceful no-op if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY isn't set. Removed: - validate-marketplace.yml + the two TS helper scripts (superseded by step 11/20 of validate-plugins). validate-frontmatter.yml is kept — it's complementary (targeted checks on agent/skill/command files for in-repo plugins). * Remove 5 external entries that fail validation at HEAD Step 30 (clone at pinned SHA + claude plugin validate) fails for these at their current HEAD: aiven Unrecognized key "logo" in plugin.json atlassian-forge-skills skill YAML frontmatter parse error sagemaker-ai skill YAML frontmatter parse error speakai no plugin manifest at repo root stagehand no plugin manifest at repo root These can be re-added once the upstream repos are fixed. * Wire scan-plugins to the detailed policy prompt Adds .github/policy/prompt.md and schema.json (the full security review rubric — malicious code, privacy, deception, safety circumvention, exfiltration; plus network-call and software-install flags) and points scan-plugins at it via the policy-prompt input. With ANTHROPIC_API_KEY now configured on the repo, scan-plugins runs the actual policy review on changed external entries instead of no-op'ing. * Bump scan-plugins action pin to include L11/L12 fixes
2026-04-27Fix shell injection in validate-frontmatter workflowfix/validate-frontmatter-shell-injectionDickson Tsai
The 'Validate frontmatter' step interpolated step output directly into a double-quoted shell string, allowing a fork PR that adds a file named e.g. agents/$(curl ...).md to execute arbitrary commands on the runner. - Pass the file list via env: and reference as "$FILES" so the shell never re-evaluates the contents - Pass PR number via env: for consistency (no ${{ }} inside run:) - Gate the job on same-repo PRs only, since fork PRs are auto-closed by close-external-prs.yml anyway Impact was bounded (fork PRs get a read-only token with no secrets), but this closes the RCE-on-runner vector entirely.
2026-04-17Add auto-SHA-bump workflow for marketplace plugins (#1392)Bryan Thompson
* Add auto-SHA-bump workflow for marketplace plugins Weekly CI action that discovers stale SHA pins in marketplace.json and opens a batched PR with updated SHAs. Adapted from the claude-plugins-community-internal bump-plugin-shas workflow for the single-file marketplace.json format. - discover_bumps.py: checks 56 SHA-pinned plugins against upstream repos, oldest-stale-first rotation, capped at 20 bumps/run - bump-plugin-shas.yml: weekly Monday schedule + manual dispatch with dry_run and per-plugin targeting options Entries without SHA pins (intentionally tracking HEAD) are never touched. Existing validate-marketplace CI runs on the resulting PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix input interpolation and add BASE_BRANCH overlay - Pass workflow_dispatch inputs through env vars instead of direct ${{ inputs.* }} interpolation in run blocks (avoids shell injection) - Add marketplace.json overlay from main so the workflow can be tested via dispatch from a feature branch against main's real plugin data Both patterns match claude-plugins-community-internal's implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use GitHub App token for PR creation The anthropics org disables "Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests", so GITHUB_TOKEN cannot call gh pr create. Split the workflow: GITHUB_TOKEN pushes the branch, then the same GitHub App used by -internal's bump workflow (app-id 2812036) creates the PR. Prerequisite: app must be installed on this repo and the PEM secret (CLAUDE_DIRECTORY_BOT_PRIVATE_KEY) must exist in repo settings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use --force-with-lease for bump branch push Prevents push failure if the branch exists from a previous same-day run whose PR was merged but whose branch wasn't auto-deleted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-20Fix frontmatter validation to skip deleted filesclaude/slack-add-claude-plugin-marketplaceClaude
The workflow was passing deleted files to the validation script, which failed when trying to read them. Add --diff-filter=AMRC to only process Added, Modified, Renamed, and Copied files.
2026-03-18Enforce alphabetical sort on marketplace.json pluginsmarketplace-sortedKenneth Lien
Adds a sort check as a second step in the existing validate-marketplace workflow. The script supports --fix to sort in place. Sorts the existing 86 entries — pure reorder, no content change. Previously grouped loosely by kind (LSPs first, then internal, then external); now strictly alphabetical so insertion point is unambiguous.
2026-03-18Add marketplace.json validation CI workflow (#347)Noah Zweben
* Add CI workflow to validate marketplace.json on PRs Add a GitHub Actions workflow that validates marketplace.json is well-formed JSON with a plugins array whenever PRs modify it. Includes: - validate-marketplace.ts: Bun script that parses and validates the JSON - validate-marketplace.yml: GH Actions workflow triggered on PR changes - test-marketplace-check.js: Unit tests for the validation logic Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Strengthen marketplace validator and remove orphaned test file - validate-marketplace.ts: check duplicate names and required fields (name, description, source) per entry, not just valid JSON - remove .github/workflows/test-marketplace-check.js: tested a checkMarketplaceViolations function that doesn't exist in the PR, and was in workflows/ instead of scripts/ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Tobin South <tobin.south@gmail.com>
2026-03-03Update webhook closed PR message link to clau.de (#500)Noah Zweben
Replace the Google Forms link with the new plugin directory submission link (https://clau.de/plugin-directory-submission). https://claude.ai/code/session_01NxRDJKDvFR2d4wC4ppDEDT Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-02-04Add CI workflow to validate YAML frontmatter in PRsdickson/validate-frontmatter-ciDickson Tsai
Adds a GitHub Actions workflow that validates frontmatter in agent, skill, and command .md files changed by a PR. Checks: - Agents: name and description are present and parseable - Skills: description is present (required for Skill tool discovery) - Commands: description is present and parseable The workflow only runs when PRs touch files in agents/, skills/, or commands/ directories, and only validates the changed files.
2026-01-06Use collaborator permission check instead of org membership (#147)Noah Zweben
2026-01-06Add write permissions for external PR workflow (#143)Noah Zweben
* Add write permissions for external PR workflow * Use pulls.createReview instead of issues.createComment * Revert to issues.createComment with proper permissions
2026-01-06Add workflow to auto-close external PRs (#140)Noah Zweben
* Add workflow to auto-close external PRs * Update PR comment wording * Add toggle to disable external PR check