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<title>superpowers.git/tests/brainstorm-server/auth.test.js, branch inline-execution</title>
<subtitle>Agentic skills framework and development workflow
</subtitle>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/superpowers.git/'/>
<entry>
<title>Fix companion test cleanup and argv assertions</title>
<updated>2026-06-16T17:09:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Drew Ritter</name>
<email>drew@primeradiant.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-11T02:37:30+00:00</published>
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</entry>
<entry>
<title>Harden companion platform tests</title>
<updated>2026-06-16T17:09:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Drew Ritter</name>
<email>drew@primeradiant.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-11T02:26:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/superpowers.git/commit/?id=51323e4c64cc2e75ddfc497b57f6803bc5f9ebf8'/>
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<entry>
<title>Harden brainstorm companion auth regressions</title>
<updated>2026-06-16T17:09:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Drew Ritter</name>
<email>drew@primeradiant.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-10T21:58:16+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/superpowers.git/commit/?id=b17d54f839831b2345aa389e2f65f435f3a82867'/>
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<entry>
<title>feat(brainstorm-server): gate every endpoint behind a per-session key</title>
<updated>2026-06-16T17:09:45+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jesse Vincent</name>
<email>jesse@primeradiant.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-09T19:22:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.1991861.xyz/superpowers.git/commit/?id=cb5bb885fd7cf00a1820f20d922df06ec02d4bed'/>
<id>cb5bb885fd7cf00a1820f20d922df06ec02d4bed</id>
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The companion server is reachable by any local browser tab (default loopback
bind) and by any host that can route to it (remote --host bind). It served
screens, files, and accepted event-injecting WebSocket connections with no
authentication, so a malicious browser tab or a direct remote client could read
brainstorm content or inject events that the agent reads as the user's input
(prompt injection into a live session).

Generate a per-session secret token, carry it in the served URL as ?key=, and
mirror it into an HttpOnly SameSite=Strict per-port cookie on first load so
same-origin subresources and the WebSocket handshake authenticate automatically.
Every HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade now requires a valid key (query or
cookie, constant-time compared); unauthenticated requests get a friendly 403
explaining they need the full URL. A secret authenticates the client uniformly
across loopback, tunnel, and remote binds and defeats DNS rebinding, which a
Host/Origin allowlist cannot.

Also guard handleMessage against a null JSON payload that crashed the process.

Tests: new auth.test.js (13 cases) covering the key on /, /files/*, and WS plus
cookie bootstrap and the null-payload guard; server.test.js threads the key;
ws-protocol.test.js + auth.test.js wired into npm test.

Closes #1014
Refs #1110, #1553, #1504
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The companion server is reachable by any local browser tab (default loopback
bind) and by any host that can route to it (remote --host bind). It served
screens, files, and accepted event-injecting WebSocket connections with no
authentication, so a malicious browser tab or a direct remote client could read
brainstorm content or inject events that the agent reads as the user's input
(prompt injection into a live session).

Generate a per-session secret token, carry it in the served URL as ?key=, and
mirror it into an HttpOnly SameSite=Strict per-port cookie on first load so
same-origin subresources and the WebSocket handshake authenticate automatically.
Every HTTP request and WebSocket upgrade now requires a valid key (query or
cookie, constant-time compared); unauthenticated requests get a friendly 403
explaining they need the full URL. A secret authenticates the client uniformly
across loopback, tunnel, and remote binds and defeats DNS rebinding, which a
Host/Origin allowlist cannot.

Also guard handleMessage against a null JSON payload that crashed the process.

Tests: new auth.test.js (13 cases) covering the key on /, /files/*, and WS plus
cookie bootstrap and the null-payload guard; server.test.js threads the key;
ws-protocol.test.js + auth.test.js wired into npm test.

Closes #1014
Refs #1110, #1553, #1504
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