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10 daysClose every pull request opened by a non-memberclose-nonmember-prsClaude
The README says this repository takes changes from team members only, but the workflow still kept some outside pull requests open based on what they contained. Remove that exception and the advisory check that mirrored it. Also run on reopen, checking who reopened, and close before commenting so a failed comment cannot leave the pull request open. Co-authored-by: jordanecker <jordanecker@anthropic.com>
10 daysCI: validate in-repo plugin folders; point submissions to ↵Tobin South
claude.ai/directory/manage (#7086) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y6KzrBh3DugYtWavUz8Hv4 Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-28Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check (#6296)Tobin South
* Exempt command sources from scope guard source.url check Command sources have no repo URL to validate, so the guard no longer fails a non-member PR that adds one. Remote-Dev: homespace * Flag unvalidated command sources in scope guard output Report command-source entries the guard skipped and stop the pass message from claiming every added entry came from a live repo. Remote-Dev: homespace
2026-06-26Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard (#3402)Bryan Thompson
* Exempt the bump bot from the external-PR scope guard The External PR Scope Guard (#3353) and the auto-closer both look up the PR author's collaborator permission and, for anyone who is not write/admin, require the PR to ADD marketplace.json entries (additions-only). Internal bump PRs are authored by github-actions[bot], which is not reported as a member, so a SHA-bump — a legitimate MODIFY of an existing entry — fails the guard (e.g. #3391 "modifies existing entry: astronomer-data-agents"). Add a shared isExemptAuthor() helper that exempts both org members and the repo's own automation bot, and route both workflows through it. Safe under pull_request_target: a fork PR cannot author as github-actions[bot] (only the org's own GITHUB_TOKEN workflow can), and the member path is still a real permission lookup. The helper also wraps getCollaboratorPermissionLevel in try/catch — previously a non-collaborator/unknown-user lookup threw and errored the job instead of falling through to scope evaluation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Correct stale "required status check" guidance in scope-guard comments The scope guard is advisory, not a required status check — the merge gate is validate + scan + a maintainer approval. The old header told operators to add it to branch protection, which is now contra-indicated (it would block the no-approval bump-merge path). Update both workflow comments to match. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-25Allow non-member PRs scoped to an already-listed plugin repo (#3353)Bryan Thompson
* feat(ci): allow live external contributors to open scoped PRs Add an opt-in allowlist so a vetted external developer who already has a plugin live in this marketplace — but cannot use the submission form (e.g. an enterprise partner without a Claude account) — can open a reviewable PR instead of having it auto-closed. - .github/external-contributors.json: username -> allowed_sources map (doubles as the allowlist and the per-author source scope). - close-external-prs.yml: skip the auto-close for allowlisted authors (reads the list from the trusted base checkout). Grants ONLY the right to open a PR; CI + maintainer approval are unchanged. - external-pr-scope-guard.yml: required check for allowlisted external authors. Fails unless the PR touches ONLY marketplace.json and the delta is additions-only, with every added entry's source.url under that author's allowed_sources. Anthropic members are unrestricted. Reads head marketplace.json as data via the API (no untrusted checkout). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(ci): neutral wording in external-contributors allowlist note Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ci): key external-PR allowlist on source org, not individuals Replace the per-username allowlist with a source-org allowlist so no individual is named in the repo. A non-member PR stays open only if it adds marketplace.json entries whose source.url is under an allowlisted prefix and changes nothing else; merge still requires CI + maintainer approval. - external-pr-allowed-sources.json: flat allowed_sources prefixes (no usernames) - scripts/external-pr-scope.js: shared additions-only / allowed-source logic - close-external-prs.yml + external-pr-scope-guard.yml: both use the shared module Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(ci): derive external-PR scope from live repos, no maintained list Replace the curated source-org allowlist with auto-derivation from the live marketplace. A non-member PR stays open only if it ADDS entries whose source.url repo ALREADY backs a live plugin here, additions-only, nothing else touched. No list to maintain, no individuals named. Trust is anchored in the source repo + pinned SHA (org-controlled), not the submitter's identity; merge still requires CI + maintainer approval. - remove external-pr-allowed-sources.json - scripts/external-pr-scope.js: derive allowed repos from base marketplace.json - both workflows drop the allowlist-file arg Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): diff external-PR scope against the merge-base, not base tip Comparing base-branch-tip -> head made a fork that is behind main report all of main's later additions as phantom removals/modifications, which would wrongly fail the scope guard for a legitimate additions-only PR. Diff merge-base -> head (the PR's actual changes) instead; keep the "already live" check against the current base branch. Found by an end-to-end run of evaluate() against real PR data (#3298 stayed clean; #3044's phantom drift collapsed to its real one-line change). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs (#1762)Tobin South
* Adopt validate-plugins action suite; pin all external SHAs Replaces the hand-rolled marketplace validator and bot-based bump workflow with the shared composite actions (pinned at f846a0b). marketplace.json: - 62 external entries that were missing a `sha` are now pinned to their current upstream HEAD (resolved via git ls-remote). Workflows: - validate-plugins.yml: invariants I1-I11 + claude plugin validate + diff-gated clone-at-SHA validation of changed external entries. SHA-pin (I5) is a hard error. I8/I11 stay warnings until the 15 known data issues (vendored dirs without manifests; one dotted name) are cleaned up. - bump-plugin-shas.yml: bot-free weekly refresh. Validates each new SHA with claude plugin validate before opening one PR; works with the default GITHUB_TOKEN (contents:write + pull-requests:write). - scan-plugins.yml: Claude policy scan of changed external entries. Non-blocking; graceful no-op if ANTHROPIC_API_KEY isn't set. Removed: - validate-marketplace.yml + the two TS helper scripts (superseded by step 11/20 of validate-plugins). validate-frontmatter.yml is kept — it's complementary (targeted checks on agent/skill/command files for in-repo plugins). * Remove 5 external entries that fail validation at HEAD Step 30 (clone at pinned SHA + claude plugin validate) fails for these at their current HEAD: aiven Unrecognized key "logo" in plugin.json atlassian-forge-skills skill YAML frontmatter parse error sagemaker-ai skill YAML frontmatter parse error speakai no plugin manifest at repo root stagehand no plugin manifest at repo root These can be re-added once the upstream repos are fixed. * Wire scan-plugins to the detailed policy prompt Adds .github/policy/prompt.md and schema.json (the full security review rubric — malicious code, privacy, deception, safety circumvention, exfiltration; plus network-call and software-install flags) and points scan-plugins at it via the policy-prompt input. With ANTHROPIC_API_KEY now configured on the repo, scan-plugins runs the actual policy review on changed external entries instead of no-op'ing. * Bump scan-plugins action pin to include L11/L12 fixes
2026-04-17Add auto-SHA-bump workflow for marketplace plugins (#1392)Bryan Thompson
* Add auto-SHA-bump workflow for marketplace plugins Weekly CI action that discovers stale SHA pins in marketplace.json and opens a batched PR with updated SHAs. Adapted from the claude-plugins-community-internal bump-plugin-shas workflow for the single-file marketplace.json format. - discover_bumps.py: checks 56 SHA-pinned plugins against upstream repos, oldest-stale-first rotation, capped at 20 bumps/run - bump-plugin-shas.yml: weekly Monday schedule + manual dispatch with dry_run and per-plugin targeting options Entries without SHA pins (intentionally tracking HEAD) are never touched. Existing validate-marketplace CI runs on the resulting PR. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix input interpolation and add BASE_BRANCH overlay - Pass workflow_dispatch inputs through env vars instead of direct ${{ inputs.* }} interpolation in run blocks (avoids shell injection) - Add marketplace.json overlay from main so the workflow can be tested via dispatch from a feature branch against main's real plugin data Both patterns match claude-plugins-community-internal's implementation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use GitHub App token for PR creation The anthropics org disables "Allow GitHub Actions to create and approve pull requests", so GITHUB_TOKEN cannot call gh pr create. Split the workflow: GITHUB_TOKEN pushes the branch, then the same GitHub App used by -internal's bump workflow (app-id 2812036) creates the PR. Prerequisite: app must be installed on this repo and the PEM secret (CLAUDE_DIRECTORY_BOT_PRIVATE_KEY) must exist in repo settings. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Use --force-with-lease for bump branch push Prevents push failure if the branch exists from a previous same-day run whose PR was merged but whose branch wasn't auto-deleted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-18Enforce alphabetical sort on marketplace.json pluginsmarketplace-sortedKenneth Lien
Adds a sort check as a second step in the existing validate-marketplace workflow. The script supports --fix to sort in place. Sorts the existing 86 entries — pure reorder, no content change. Previously grouped loosely by kind (LSPs first, then internal, then external); now strictly alphabetical so insertion point is unambiguous.
2026-03-18Add marketplace.json validation CI workflow (#347)Noah Zweben
* Add CI workflow to validate marketplace.json on PRs Add a GitHub Actions workflow that validates marketplace.json is well-formed JSON with a plugins array whenever PRs modify it. Includes: - validate-marketplace.ts: Bun script that parses and validates the JSON - validate-marketplace.yml: GH Actions workflow triggered on PR changes - test-marketplace-check.js: Unit tests for the validation logic Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Strengthen marketplace validator and remove orphaned test file - validate-marketplace.ts: check duplicate names and required fields (name, description, source) per entry, not just valid JSON - remove .github/workflows/test-marketplace-check.js: tested a checkMarketplaceViolations function that doesn't exist in the PR, and was in workflows/ instead of scripts/ --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Tobin South <tobin.south@gmail.com>
2026-02-17fix(ci): skip frontmatter validation for files nested inside skill contentkenshiro/add-skill-creator-20260217Kenshiro Nakagawa
The detectFileType function matched any .md file under an agents/ or commands/ directory, including those nested inside skill content (e.g. plugins/foo/skills/bar/agents/). These are reference docs, not plugin agent definitions. Only validate agents/ and commands/ at the plugin root level.
2026-02-04Add CI workflow to validate YAML frontmatter in PRsdickson/validate-frontmatter-ciDickson Tsai
Adds a GitHub Actions workflow that validates frontmatter in agent, skill, and command .md files changed by a PR. Checks: - Agents: name and description are present and parseable - Skills: description is present (required for Skill tool discovery) - Commands: description is present and parseable The workflow only runs when PRs touch files in agents/, skills/, or commands/ directories, and only validates the changed files.